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Abstract
This paper quantitatively explores the role of the demand structure in explaining the
relationship between an importer's per capita income and the extensive margin of bilateral
trade. The underlying mechanism is based on the fact that agents expand the set of goods
they consume with income. This in turn affects the structure of a country's import demand
and therewith the extensive margin of trade. We formalize this intuition by incorporating
preferences that allow for binding non-negativity constraints into an otherwise standard
Ricardian multi-country model. We quantify the model using the data on US consumer
expenditures and aggregate values of bilateral trade flows and find that the behavior of
the model's extensive margin of bilateral trade is consistent with the data (as opposed to
the standard model). Two popular counterfactual experiments  lower trade costs and the
rise of China and India  demonstrate that the mechanism outlined in this paper is indeed
quantitatively important.
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JEL Classification: F10, F11, F19
1 Introduction
Trade flows vary greatly in the number of different goods that are traded between countries.
This extensive margin of bilateral trade can be thought of as the manifestation of an interplay
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of the exporter's production technology, the importer's demand structure, and bilateral trade
costs - two countries are more likely to trade a given good if the exporter is particularly strong
in producing this good, the importer has an especially high demand for that good, or bilateral
trade barriers are low. Most existing analyses of the extensive margin of bilateral trade focus
on the exporter's technology and bilateral trade costs.1 This paper provides a complementary
perspective by emphasizing the role of the importing country's demand structure.
Several studies have documented that richer countries both import and export more varieties
(see e.g. Hummels and Klenow (2002), Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), or Sauré (2012)). Table 1
summarizes these findings by regressing the extensive margin of bilateral trade in consumption
goods2 (in logs) on the per capita incomes and population sizes (both in logs) of the trading
partners controlling for bilateral resistance.
Table 1
The positive elasticity of exporter per capita income can be explained by a standard Ricar-
dian mechanism: per capita income is high due to a country's advanced technology. Being
technologically advanced in turn implies that this country is competitive in many industries
and, therefore, tends to export a broad set of varieties (which generates the positive correlation
between exporter income and the extensive margin of trade). At the same time, however, it
follows immediately that the number of varieties the country imports is relatively low since it
is optimal to produce most varieties locally due to the advanced technology. As a result, a
standard Ricardian framework (with CES preferences) implies a negative elasticity of the ex-
tensive margin of trade with respect to importer per capita income, which is inconsistent with
the data. In this paper, we argue that the fact that consumers expand the set of goods they
purchase  henceforth called the extensive margin of consumption  with income generates a
countervailing force that can change the sign of the elasticity.3
To formalize this intuition, we adapt the Ricardian multi-country model by Eaton and
Kortum (2002) (henceforth EK). The production technology in the EK framework is country-
variety specific. Together with trade costs this determines the price at which a supplying
country can offer a variety in a particular destination market. In any given destination market
the producer country offering the lowest price will be the sole supplier of this variety. However,
whether this trade flow then actually materializes depends not only on the supplier country's
good technology and low bilateral trade costs, but crucially also on the importing country's
1See, for instance, Chaney (2008).
2We limit the analysis to consumption goods, as the channel proposed in this paper affects the patterns of
final demand only. Details on the data can be found in Appendix A.6.
3Jackson (1984) documents the empirical relevance of the extensive margin of consumption using US
consumer expenditure data. Falkinger and Zweimüller (1996) provide evidence that richer countries consume
a broader set of goods using the World Bank's ICP-data. Other studies documenting a positive correlation
between variety and income include Jekanowski and Binkley (2000), Moon, Florkowski, Beuchat, Resurreccion,
Paraskova, Jordanov, and Chinnan (2002), and Thiele and Weiss (2003) for food consumption and Gronau and
Hamermesh (2008) documenting similar effects in time use data.
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demand structure - particularly if there is actually a positive demand for this variety at the
price offered. With traditional CES preferences demand is always positive, as marginal utility
is unbounded. In the present paper, we relax this assumption and allow agents to adjust
their extensive margin of consumption with income. In choosing their optimal consumption
bundle agents order the varieties in accordance with their prices and decide up to which price
consuming positive quantities is optimal. It is therefore possible that the lowest price offered
by the supplier countries for a given variety is still too high, so that agents in the importing
country find it optimal not to consume (and, therefore, not to import) this variety. As a result,
the model is in principle able to explain the empirical behavior of the extensive margin of trade.
In order to assess whether this demand side mechanism is actually strong enough to dom-
inate the negative effect coming from the supply side we quantify the model. In particular,
we use aggregate values of bilateral trade flows to estimate the model's technologies and trade
costs and microdata on US consumer expenditure to pin down the preference parameters. The
advantage of using data on US consumer expenditure is that this data set is independent from
the trade data, implying that the estimates of the preference parameters are independent from
the trade data as well. Therefore, when we then simulate the calibrated model and compare
the behavior of the model's extensive margin of bilateral trade to the data, we compare the
model's predictions to an aspect of the data that has not been used in quantifying the model.
We find that the demand side forces are sufficiently strong to dominate the negative effect of
technology on the extensive margin of imports. Comparing the simulated income elasticities of
the extensive margin of bilateral trade to the data, we find that they are of the right sign and
close to the empirical elasticities.
What is the quantitative importance of this new demand side channel? To answer this
question, we use the calibrated model to perform two classical counterfactual experiments -
lowering trade costs and the rise of China and India. A traditional model neglecting the
demand side predicts that lower trade costs lead to a higher extensive margin of trade since
trade becomes worthwhile for more varieties. The demand side reinforces this effect: lower
trade costs lead to a higher real income and, thereby, induce agents to expand their extensive
margin of consumption. This in turn increases the number of traded varieties. Quantitatively,
we find that the predicted changes in the extensive margin of bilateral trade flows are at
least twice as high when allowing for the extensive margin of consumption to adjust. In the
second experiment, we explore the effect of technological progress in China and India. Better
local technologies imply that these countries will tend to produce more varieties locally since
they become more competitive. However, a rise in income will lead consumers to expand the
measure of varieties that they consume. This effect dominates: the model with non-homothetic
preferences therefore predicts that the extensive margin of imports will rise, while the model
neglecting demand side effects would actually predict falling extensive margins (that is, the two
countries would import fewer varieties as they become richer).
This paper contributes to two strands of the trade literature. First, by highlighting the
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role of the importer's demand structure, it contributes to the broad literature investigating the
extensive margin of trade. Second, on a more theoretical side, it contributes to the growing
literature that recognizes the potential importance of non-homothetic consumer behavior in
understanding different aspects of trade patterns. The focus of previous contributions was on
how non-homothetic consumer behavior helps us to understand variations in the aggregate val-
ues of trade flows and differences in unit prices4, whereas this study focuses on the extensive
margin of trade. As for the aggregate values of trade flows, Fieler (2011) argues that non-
homothetic preferences help to explain the higher trade share of rich countries. She extends the
EK model to two industries with differing demand elasticities. Richer countries then relatively
concentrate their expenditures in the high-elasticity industries. If the variability in produc-
tivities across countries is relatively high in these industries, their share of traded output will
be high. Together with the demand pattern, this implies that rich countries' trade shares are
higher. However, agents in her model do not adjust their extensive margin of consumption.
The predictions with respect to the extensive margin of trade are therefore the same as in EK:
i.e., a counterfactual negative correlation of per capita income and the extensive margin of im-
ports. Another aspect of trade patterns where non-homotheticity is potentially relevant is the
variation in unit-prices across importing countries. Simonovska (2010) argues that differences
in unit prices reflect differences in markups arising due to demand elasticities that change with
income. Choi, Hummels, and Xiang (2009) and Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011),
on the other hand, understand differences in unit-prices as reflecting quality differences due to
an increasing taste for quality with rising income.
Concerning the extensive margin of trade, Sauré (2012) argues that richer countries have
more trading partners (the country level extensive margin) due to non-homothetic preferences
and Foellmi, Hepenstrick, and Zweimüller (2010) show that non-homothetic preferences can
generate incentives for parallel trade and influence the extensive margin of trade via this chan-
nel. Matsuyama (2000) shows how a hierarchy in consumption can interact with comparative
advantages and, therefore, give a rise to product cycles and effects reminiscent of the Prebisch-
Singer hypothesis. The contribution of the present paper is a quantitative multi-country model
of trade where consumers in an importing country decide on their extensive margin of con-
sumption. This decision then determines, together with the exporters' technologies and the
structure of trade costs, the extensive margins of bilateral trade flows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3
then discusses the quantification and its results. In this paper, we use the EK framework
since it is parsimonious in the context of our objective - it allows us to develop our argument
in a very intuitive way, while providing us at the same time with a model, which is general
enough to be quantified directly. However, the message of the demand side being an important
determinant of the extensive margin of trade is more general. Therefore, in Section 4, we discuss
4For a more complete overview of the literature on non-homothetic preferences and trade see Markusen
(2010).
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how demand side effects would play in a model of monopolistic competition and heterogeneous
firms and what additional effects and complications may arise. Section 5 discusses a number
of extensions. First, we show that accounting for trade in intermediates does not significantly
change the quantitative predictions of the model. Second, we consider the implications of
allowing for within-country inequality. Finally, we show that the results are not driven by a
particular functional form of the utility function. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The world economy consists of N asymmetric countries. Country i's population is denoted by
Li. Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor, which is inelastically supplied on the domestic
market. There is one industry producing differentiated consumption goods. The measure of
varieties is exogenous and normalized to unity.
2.1 Consumer behavior
Agents maximize the same symmetric additively separable utility function
U =
ˆ 1
0
v (x (j)) dj
subject to their budget constraints E ≥ ´ 1
0
p (j)x (j) dj and the non-negativity constraints
x (j) ≥ 0 ∀ j. E denotes an agent's income. The sub-utility function v (x) is concave, v′ (x) > 0
and v′′ (x) < 0, and the marginal utility is bounded from above, v′ (0) < ∞. With bounded
marginal utility, the non-negativity constraints are potentially binding and the corresponding
first order conditions for some variety j are
v′ (x (j)) = λp (j) for x (j) > 0
v′ (0) < λp (j) for x (j) = 0
(2.1)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Intuitively, for every available variety j, an agent compares
the marginal utility from starting to consume this variety v′ (0) with her utility costs λp (j)
associated with buying a marginal unit of this variety. If the marginal costs are higher than
the marginal utility, the optimal quantity is zero - the non-negativity constraint binds. The
optimal quantities are positive for all other varieties and are chosen such that the marginal
rates of substitution equal relative prices. Figure 1 depicts the demand function for a particular
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variety j. Note that there is a finite price v′ (0) /λ above which the optimal quantity is zero.
Figure 1
As the varieties enter the utility function symmetrically, agents simply order the varieties
according to their prices (think of reindexing the varieties such that the prices rise in the
index j) and then choose up to which price they still want to consume positive quantities. We
denote the index of this marginal variety by M . Its price follows from rearranging the first
order condition (2.1) when the non-negativity constraint just binds, p (M) = v′ (0) /λ. As the
indices are increasing in prices, M also denotes the measure of varieties consumed in positive
quantities and thus represents the extensive margin of consumption in this model. Because
the goods spectrum is normalized to one, the extensive margin of consumption simultaneously
represents the share of available varieties consumed in positive quantities.
Assuming that the price distribution can be represented by a continuous cdf G (p) - this
will be the case in the general equilibrium - the share of consumed varieties (and therefore also
the extensive margin of consumption) is
M = G (v′ (0) /λ) . (2.2)
For varieties j < M , the Marshallian demand follows from rearranging the first order
condition, x (λp) = v′−1 (λp). Inserting the Marshallian demand into the budget constraint
and making the change of variable p = G−1 (j) yields
E =
ˆ v′(0)/λ
0
px (λp) dG (p) (2.3)
implicitly determining the marginal utility of income λ for a given price distribution G (p) and
income E. We will know the price distribution and the income in the equilibrium and thus
be able to solve for the multiplier λ. Using (2.2), one then solves for the extensive margin of
consumption and (2.1) determines the optimal quantities for varieties j < M .
The potentially binding non-negativity constraints contrast with previous EK models (see
for example EK and Fieler, 2011) that assume CES preferences.5 The unbounded marginal
utility of CES preferences implies that agents in this class of models always consume all varieties,
M = 1, independent of the price distribution and income.
5Fieler (2011) models two industries with different elasticities of substitution. Agents therefore adjust their
relative expenditures across industries with income and thus exhibit a non-homothetic consumption pattern.
However, since the marginal utility is unbounded, the agents do not adjust the sets from which they consume,
i.e. all agents always consume all varieties in both industries.
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2.2 Production technology and market structure
The supply side of the model is similar to the basic EK framework: The production technology
exhibits constant returns to scale and uses one input6, which we call labor. Labor is assumed
to be perfectly mobile within countries, but immobile across countries, so that in equilibrium
there will be one wage rate wi per country. zi (j) denotes country i's productivity in producing
variety j. Assuming perfect competition and iceberg trade costs7 - dni ≥ 1 units need to be
shipped in i for one unit to arrive at destination n - implies that the price at which country i
offers variety j in country n is
pni (j) =
widni
zi (j)
. (2.4)
The country-variety specific productivity zi (j) is the realization of a Fréchet distributed random
variable Zi (j):
Pr [Zi (j) ≤ z] = exp
{−Tiz−θ} ,
where Ti is country specific and governs the expected productivity draw. We will therefore refer
to Ti as country i's technology (higher Ti implies a higher expected productivity and, therefore,
represents a more advanced technology in country i). θ is common to all countries and controls
the variation in the productivities (the lower θ, the more variation there is in productivity
draws). We will show later that θ also governs the elasticity of trade volumes with respect to
trade costs, which is why we sometimes refer to θ as the trade elasticity.
2.3 Equilibrium
All countries i are in principle able to produce each variety j. However, consumers will pur-
chase each variety from only one producing country - the country offering the lowest price.
International trade thus emerges if the country with the lowest price is a foreign country. In
Appendix A.1, we show that the lowest prices available in country n can be represented by the
following cdf:
Gn (p) = 1− exp
{−Φnpθ} , (2.5)
where
Φn =
N∑
i=1
Ti (widni)
−θ .
I.e., Gn (p) is the share of varieties in country n with a price (weakly) below p. As all agents
are endowed with one unit of labor, the income of an agent in country n is simply the wage
6For parsimony, we abstain from modeling multiple inputs. This implies that, in the calibration exercise,
differences in non-tradable endowments (e.g. human and physical capital) and price indices for tradable inter-
mediates are absorbed into the calibrated technology. This is admissible for non-tradable endowments in the
context of the counterfactuals. For tradable intermediate inputs, we show in Section 5 how the results change
when allowing for them.
7We normalize trade costs within a country to unity: dnn = 1 for all n; and assume that the triangle
inequality, dni ≤ dkidnk, holds for all i, k, and n.
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rate, wn (to be endogenously determined). For a given wage rate, the budget constraint (2.3)
together with the price distribution therefore determines the marginal utility in country n, λn.
The extensive margin of consumption in n follows immediately,
Mn = 1− exp
{
−Φn (v′ (0) /λn)θ
}
. (2.6)
In Appendix A.2, we derive the probability, pini, that country i is the cheapest supplier of a
certain variety in country n,
pini =
Ti (widni)
−θ
Φn
.
Note that, since there is a continuum of goods, pini is also the share of varieties for which country
i is the cheapest supplier in n. Moreover, because the probability is the same for all goods,
pini is not only the share of the total goods spectrum, but also the share for any sub-spectrum;
in particular also for an importing country's extensive margin of consumption. This in turn
implies that the extensive margin of the bilateral trade flow from i to n, which we denote by
mni, is simply the importing country's extensive margin of consumption, Mn, multiplied by the
share of varieties for which the exporter i is the cheapest producer, pini,
mni = piniMn. (2.7)
The source of the remarkable simplicity of this result is worth discussing. The distributional
assumption of the EK framework implies that conditional on entering market n, prices have
the same distribution across supplier countries.8 Therefore, the prices of the goods that the
importer n actually buys bear no information about the likely source of these goods, so that pini
is the share of varieties of any subinterval of the variety space for which the supplier i offers the
cheapest price in n - in particular, for the subintervalMn representing theMn percent cheapest
varieties as well (in Appendix A.3, we provide the corresponding derivations).
Since the distribution of prices of goods that are actually sold in n is the same across supplier
countries i, average sales (per product) do not vary by source. In the model, average sales in
n are given by the total expenditures, wnLn, divided by the extensive margin of consumption,
wnLn/Mn. The aggregate value of the bilateral trade flow from i to n, Xni, is given by the
average sales multiplied by the measure of varieties for which i is the cheapest supplier in n
and which are actually consumed in positive quantities - the extensive margin of trade, mni -
which yields
Xni = mni(wnLn/Mn) = piniwnLn. (2.8)
Note that, taking the derivative of the log of volumes with respect to the log of trade costs,
8Eaton and Kortum (2005) call this feature neutrality. Note that neutrality is not unique to the Ricardian
framework. In the monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms and market entry costs, neutrality
follows if market entry costs are only destination specific and productivities are drawn from a Pareto distribution.
Costinot and Komunjer (2007) provide a discussion of general productivity distributions in the Ricardian multi-
country framework.
8
yields θ (neglecting general equilibrium effects on the wage rates), which is why θ is sometimes
called the trade elasticity.
To close the model and determine the equilibrium wage vector, we use the labor market
clearing conditions9
wiLi =
N∑
n=1
Ti (widni)
−θ∑N
k=1 Tk (wkdnk)
−θwnLn for i = 1, ..., N. (2.9)
In summary, the structure of the global economy is characterized by the countries' technolo-
gies, Ti, and populations, Li, the matrix of bilateral trade costs, dni, the trade elasticity, θ, and
the shape of the utility function, v (·). In the equilibrium, producers price according to (2.4)
and consumers choose their optimal quantities and extensive margins (2.6) as implied by (2.1).
Market clearing (2.9) pins down the set of equilibrium wage rates and bilateral trade patterns
are characterized by their aggregate value (2.8) and their extensive margin (2.7).10
2.4 The role of per capita income
In this section, we discuss how per capita income affects trade patterns and contrast the results
with the standard model with homothetic preferences.11 In the context of this paper, the role
of non-homothetic preferences is to endogenize the extensive margin of consumption. Figure 2
illustrates this by depicting equation (2.6).
Figure 2
The price of the marginal variety is v′ (0) /λn. Using the country specific price distribution
Gn (p), one gets the share of varieties with prices lower than this marginal price and thus
the share (and measure) of varieties consumed in positive quantities - the extensive margin
of consumption. An increase in per capita income lowers the marginal utility of income λn
and thus increases the extensive margin of consumption - richer countries consume a broader
set of varieties. A first order stochastic dominance shift in the price distribution increases
9The labor market clearing condition follows from imposing balanced trade,
∑
k 6=iXik =
∑
n 6=iXni, and
adding the domestically sourced consumption, Xii, on both sides to get
∑N
k=1Xik =
∑N
n=1Xni. Total expen-
ditures in i are wiLi =
∑N
k=1Xik. Substituting for Xni and pini on the right hand side then yields the labor
market clearing condition as stated in the text.
10The general equilibrium exists and is unique. To see this, note that the labor market clearing conditions can
be rewritten as excess demand for labor. It is straightforward to show that the resulting system of excess demand
functions satisfies the sufficient properties for existence and uniqueness (see for example Propositions 17.B.2
and 17.F.3 in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995)). The extensive margins and the optimal quantities are
unique, as they follow from maximizing a concave object over a convex constraint. As wages and extensive
margins fully summarize the general equilibrium, this implies that the general equilibrium is unique.
11With homothetic preferences, expenditure shares are constant. One can show that a linear transformation of
the widely used CES-preferences is indeed the most general form of additively separable homothetic preferences.
Note that homotheticity (for additive preferences) requires v′ (0) =∞, as sufficiently poor agents will otherwise
not buy an expensive variety, i.e. their expenditure share is zero, whereas the expenditure share of sufficiently
rich agents is positive, which contradicts homotheticity.
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the extensive margin of consumption as well - countries that are better integrated and that,
therefore, have lower prices consume a broader set of varieties. Note finally that for v′ (0)→∞,
the extensive margin approaches one and agents would not adjust their extensive margins with
income.
In the Ricardian framework, a country's per capita income depends on that country's tech-
nology - the better technology, the higher the wage rate and thus per capita income. Thus, in
the present model, there are two channels of how an importing country n's technology affects
the extensive margin of trade. The first channel is the standard supply side channel. A better
technology implies better productivity draws for more varieties, so that the share of varieties
pinn for which local producers offer the best prices rises. But this means that the share of vari-
eties that are imported, (1− pinn), and thus the extensive margin of bilateral trade tends to fall.
On the other hand, the non-homothetic model exhibits the second channel. Better technology
leads to higher wages and agents, therefore, extend their extensive margin of consumption,
which tends to increase the extensive margin of trade. In the calibrated version of the present
model, it turns out that the latter effect dominates, so that the extensive margin of bilateral
trade is positively correlated with per capita income (which is consistent with the data). In the
homothetic model, on the other hand, only the first effect is present (all countries' extensive
margins of consumption are equal to one) and the correlation between the extensive margin of
trade and an importer income is unambiguously negative. Note also that the decomposition
of aggregate GDP into population size and per capita income matters in the non-homothetic
model - a rich but small country has a high extensive margin of consumption and thus also
tends to import a broad set of varieties, whereas the opposite is true for a poor but large coun-
try, although the two countries may have the same aggregate GDP. This is also consistent with
the data (see Table 1).
While the non-homothetic and the homothetic model can have opposing predictions for the
extensive margin of bilateral trade, they exhibit the same pattern for the aggregate volumes.
This feature is very useful when calibrating the model and comparing its performance to the
homothetic model. Note also that with respect to aggregate volumes, neither model has a
separate role for differences in per capita incomes induced by different technologies.12
3 Quantifying the model
In this section, we quantify the model to assess whether the above theory is able to explain
the behavior of the extensive margin of trade. We calibrate the parameters in the model using
data on aggregate trade volumes and US consumer behavior. We then simulate the calibrated
12In the data, richer countries tend to trade more. One potential explanation is brought forward by Waugh
(2010) and Tarasov (2012a), who argue that richer countries have systematically lower trade costs (specifically,
Waugh (2010) focuses on cross-country variation in variable trade costs, while Tarasov (2012a) explores the
role of fixed costs of trade in explaining the evidence). We capture this in the calibration by following Waugh
(2010)'s approach to modeling variable trade costs.
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model and compare the behavior of its extensive margin of bilateral trade with the data. The
data are described in detail in Appendix A.6.
3.1 Parametrization of the utility function
We have shown above that the effects discussed emerge for a broad class of sub-utility functions
v (x). The central property is a bounded marginal utility, v′ (x) <∞. To quantify the model,
we need to choose a certain parametric form for v (x) . We will use the Stone-Geary form
v (x) = log (x¯+ x) ,
where x¯ ≥ 0, as the thus parametrized model nests the standard homothetic model with x¯ = 0.13
The preference parameter x¯ represents the degree of non-homotheticity. In the context of this
paper, it is particularly important that it governs the marginal utility of starting to consume
an additional variety, v′ (0) = 1/x¯. The closer the non-homotheticity parameter x¯ gets to zero,
the larger the marginal utility of consuming new varieties and thus the weaker the demand side
effects on the extensive margin of trade. For x¯ = 0, the marginal utility approaches infinity
and agents find consuming all available varieties optimal, no matter how expensive they are.
In the robustness section, we show that the results remain unchanged for alternative pref-
erences specifications with bounded marginal utility such as quadratic preferences and CARA
preferences.
3.2 Calibration strategy
The theoretical model's bilateral trade patterns are characterized by two moments - the exten-
sive margin of trade and the aggregate trade volume. Volumes are governed by
Xni = piniwnLn,
and the extensive margins are
mni = piniMn.
The labor market clearing condition, wiLi =
∑N
n=1 Xni, determines the equilibrium wage rates
and the equilibrium extensive margins of consumption (that follow from the budget restriction
(2.3)). In Appendix A.4, we show that with the Stone-Geary preferences, the budget restriction
can be written as
wn = x¯ (Φn)
− 1
θ
(
Mn (− log (1−Mn))
1
θ − γ
(
1
θ
+ 1;− log (1−Mn)
))
, (3.1)
13For x¯ = 0, the preferences become CES preferences with an elasticity of substitution of one. Since the
quantitative behavior of the homothetic model is independent of the elasticity of substitution (see Alvarez and
Lucas (2007)), the results represent the general CES model.
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where γ (z, t¯) =
´ t¯
0
tz−1e−tdt is the incomplete Gamma function.
The model parameters are the countries' technologies Ti and populations Li, the bilateral
trade costs dni, the non-homotheticity parameter x¯, and the trade elasticity θ. While the
populations can be taken from the data, we need to calibrate the remaining parameters. In the
following, we describe how we calibrate these parameters. The data used for the calibration
is discussed en passant with a more complete description in Appendix A.6. We start with the
calibration strategy for the non-homotheticity parameter, as this is the most novel part of the
model. We then discuss the trade elasticity, trade costs, and technologies in turn.
3.2.1 Non-homotheticity parameter
To calibrate the non-homotheticity parameter, we use data from the US Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX) for the year 2003. The advantage of using this source is its independence from
the trade data. Based on this database, we construct the expenditures of approximately 3000
households for 107 different categories of tradable goods such as Encyclopedia and other sets of
reference books, Wigs, hairpieces, or toupees, and Winter sports equipment. Details can be
found in Appendix A.6. Counting the categories with positive expenditure gives us a measure
for the extensive margin in consumption of a household. Table 2 reports the elasticity of this
measure of the extensive margin with respect to total expenditures controlling for demographic
variables such as household size, age of the reference person, and geography, i.e. rural/urban
and region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West).
Table 2
Table 2 also reports the elasticities for a more liberal expenditure classification that comprises
186 categories.14 Clearly, the positive elasticity is robust across specifications lying between
0.4 and 0.5. For the calibration, we target the elasticity associated with the conservative
classification and the specification including all the controls, 0.41.
To understand the details of the calibration, first note that only the relative technologies
matter for trade volumes, which implies that we cannot identify the absolute level of the tech-
nologies using aggregate trade volumes. In the budget constraint (3.1), on the other hand, the
absolute level of technologies is relevant since it determines the level of Φn. Moreover, note
that scaling all technologies by a constant has the same effect as scaling the non-homotheticity
parameter. We can therefore normalize either the level of technologies or the preference param-
eter. It is convenient to normalize the level of the technologies such that the US aggregator,
14The main difference lies in the treatment of housing- and gender-related categories. The conservative
classification excludes these categories, whereas the liberal classification aggregates over categories that represent
the same item but are differentiated by renter/owner or women/men/girls/boys.
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ΦUS, equals one. Then, the budget constraint of a US-agent h with income wUS,h is
wUS,h = x¯
(
MUS,h (− log (1−MUS,h))
1
θ − γ
(
1
θ
+ 1;− log (1−MUS,h)
))
.
We setθ = 4.5 (see the next section). For a given non-homotheticity parameter x, we can
feed all the CEX households' expenditures into the budget constraint and calculate the cor-
responding extensive margins of consumption. We then choose the preference parameter such
that the resulting elasticity of the extensive margin of consumption matches the empirical CEX
elasticity.15,16
3.2.2 Trade elasticity
For the trade elasticity, we take the value estimated by Simonovska and Waugh (2012), θ = 4.5.
In general, one cannot identify the trade elasticity and the level of trade costs separately
by estimating a gravity equation - the trade elasticity may be high and trade costs low or,
conversely, the elasticity low and trade costs high. To tackle this problem, EK argue that
one can use disaggregated price data from the World Bank's International Comparison Project
(ICP) and take the maximal (or second highest) within good price difference as an estimate for
bilateral trade costs. As the resulting value for trade costs has been obtained independently
from trade volumes, one then can solve for the trade elasticity, which is implied by a gravity
type regression. Simonovska and Waugh (2012) extend this approach. They provide a more
elaborate estimation strategy that controls for an aggregation bias arising from the fact that
it is very unlikely that the highest price difference represents actually the trade costs due to
the small number of goods categories in the ICP (around 80). They also use a broader set
of countries (123) and are thus able to check if the trade elasticity systematically varies with
development level, which they find not to be the case. The structural framework for their
estimation is the EK model. Since the present model behaves identically to the EK model
with respect to volumes and prices, we can directly adapt the Simonovska and Waugh (2012)
baseline estimate of θ = 4.5.
15The resulting value is x = 3.14. In contrast to the elasticity of substitution of CES preferences, for example,
this parameter does not have a standalone interpretation (beyond the fact that it is not zero), since measures
such as the demand elasticity or the elasticity of substitution change with income and prices. Therefore, x is
only meaningful when income and price distribution are known or, as in the case here, when a model giving rise
to income and prices is parametrically specified.
16At first sight, the fact that we use within country inequality to calibrate the model where countries are
populated by representative agents may seem surprising. We address this objection in the robustness section,
where we consider the potential role of within-country inequality. We also refer to the well-established practice
in the macro literature using micro-economically estimated elasticities to calibrate macro models populated by
representative agents.
13
3.2.3 Trade costs
We calibrate the trade costs using aggregate bilateral trade volumes of the year 2003. In
particular, we follow Waugh (2010) in modeling unobserved trade costs as a function of observed
proxies and an exporter fixed effect:
dni = exp {δk + b+ l + exi + εni} ,
where we suppressed the associated dummy variables for expositional simplicity. δk (k = 1, ..., 6)
is the effect of the bilateral distance between countries i and n lying in in the kth distance
interval. The intervals are (in miles): [0, 375), [375, 750), [750, 1500), [1500, 3000), [3000, 6000),
and [6000,∞). b is the effect of sharing a border, and l the effect of having the same language.
exi is an exporter fixed effect that allows for asymmetry in bilateral trade costs and εni captures
all other trade barriers and is assumed to be orthogonal to the exporter fixed effects, distance,
border, and language.
Normalizing the volume of the bilateral trade flow from i to n (equation (2.8)) with the
importer's home sales Xnn yields
Xni
Xnn
= (dni)
−θ Si
Sn
, (3.2)
where Si = Ti (wi)
−θ is a country fixed effect. The value of the bilateral trade flow Xni is
observed, while - in the context of the model - Xnn is simply a country's aggregate GDP less
its total imports.17 Imposing the above trade cost function yields a Gravity-type equation,
which we estimate using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator proposed by Silva
and Tenreyro (2006).18 Table 3 reports the resulting estimates for the trade cost parameters
together with the implied effects on trade costs (in percentage, relative to a country-pair with
a bilateral distance between 0 and 375 miles without a common border and without a shared
language) and some summary statistics on the estimated trade costs.
Table 3
The average and median trade costs among OECD countries are 2.01 and 1.89 respectively,
which is slightly higher than the often cited 1.7 suggested by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004)
and very much in line with Waugh (2010). Consistent with the findings in the literature, trade
costs among non-OECD countries are considerably higher.
17It is important to mention two potential caveats related to the way the model is mapped to the data. First,
we use aggregate trade volumes, which include also non-consumption goods such as intermediates. Second,
whereas trade is measured in gross values, GDP is measured as value added, which again in the context of
intermediates may be of importance. We address both caveats in the robustness section where we extend the
model by allowing for intermediates. It turns out that the main results remain basically the same. The reason
for this may be that the share of consumption goods in trade flows is unrelated to per capita GDP and aggregate
GDP, so that no systematic bias emerges.
18The reason we use the PPML estimator is that there are a number of zero bilateral trade flows in the data.
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3.2.4 Technologies
The most straightforward approach to recovering technologies is to follow Fieler (2011) and take
per capita incomes19 as a proxy for wages - indeed, wages and per capita incomes coincide in
the model. Using the estimates for the country fixed effects, Sˆi, one then can directly solve for
the implied technologies, Tˆi = Sˆi (wi)
θ. An alternative approach disregards the country fixed
effects and uses the market clearing conditions (2.9) to recover the technologies. Specifically,
plugging the per capita incomes, the estimated trade costs, and the trade elasticity into the
market clearing conditions allows us to solve for the unique set of technologies for which all
markets clear. Figure 3 plots the expected productivity draw in a country, Ei [z] = T
1/θ
i , against
its per capita income.
Figure 3
Clearly, the two approaches yield very similar technologies. Moreover, as to be expected,
there is a high correlation between estimated technology and observed incomes. Note, however,
that the correlation is not perfect, as different geographic locations imply that countries with
the same technology face different levels of demand and thus have different equilibrium incomes.
For the remainder of the paper, we use the technologies calibrated using the market clearing
conditions.20
3.3 Calibration results
Given the calibrated parameters, we can now simulate the model and compare the behavior of
its extensive margin to the data. Remember that with respect to volumes, the non-homothetic
model behaves identically to the homothetic model. As we used volumes to calibrate technolo-
gies and trade costs, these calibrated values also apply to the homothetic model. That is, we
obtain the homothetic model's predictions simply by setting the non-homotheticity parameter
to zero, x = 0.
We highlighted the positive correlation between the extensive margin of bilateral trade and
the per capita incomes of the trading partners in the introduction (see Table 1). Table 4 reports
the income elasticities that follow from repeating the regressions cited in the introduction using
the data generated by the model.
Table 4
Both models yield the same elasticity with respect to the exporter income. Moreover, the
elasticity is reasonably close to what is observed in the data. For the importer income elasticity,
on the other hand, only the non-homothetic model's sign is consistent with the data. The non-
homothetic model's elasticity is with 0.63 somewhat higher than the data's income elasticity
19In the context of the model, the use of nominal incomes is appropriate as deviations from PPP are endoge-
nous in the EK framework.
20The results for the alternative technologies are very similar, with differences in the outcomes typically lying
within 1-2%.
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of around 0.5, but still reasonably close. The homothetic model, on the other hand, predicts
a negative importer income elasticity of -0.12. The reason for this counterfactual prediction
is its negligence of the extensive margin of consumption meaning that only the negative effect
of a technologically advanced country producing more varieties locally is present. In the non-
homothetic model, this negative effect is dominated by a positive effect coming from the demand
side - the expanding extensive margin of consumption. Figure 4 plots the calibrated extensive
margin of consumption against per capita income.
Figure 4
Note that the relation is not perfect due to differences in the remoteness. Spain and New
Zealand, for example, had the same nominal per capita income in 2003, but Spain's calibrated
extensive margin of consumption is almost 10% higher than that of New Zealand as Spain's
geographic location is much more favorable. This means that prices tend to be lower in Spain,
so that its real income is higher and agents find consuming a broader set of varieties optimal.
3.4 The quantitative importance of the demand side
In this section, we perform two counterfactual experiments. The goal of these exercises is to
demonstrate that accounting for demand side effects is quantitatively important when examin-
ing the reaction of the extensive margins of trade to changes in the economic environment. In
each case, we start with the world economy as calibrated in the previous section and compare
the counterfactual outcome to the initial situation.
3.4.1 The rise of China and India
One of the most important trends in the global economy is the rise of China and India. These
two countries experienced spectacular growth rates in the recent years - according to the World
Development Indicators (World Bank (2010)), China's per capita income almost doubled (95%)
relative to the world per capita income between 1993 and 2003, and India's per capita income
grew by 31% relative to world per capita income. In this experiment, we consider the calibrated
2003 world economy and ask how trade patterns would change if China's and India's technolo-
gies were to improve such that their incomes rose again by the same magnitudes relative to the
world income.
The homothetic model predicts that, as China's and India's technologies improve, these two
countries become competitive in more varieties. These countries will therefore export a broader
set of varieties to their trading partners (the median increase is 64% for China and 19% for
India). At the same time, the better technology implies also that these countries will import
a narrower set of varieties - China is predicted to source 44% more varieties locally, whereas
India's home share extends by 5%. This translates into a median decrease in the extensive
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margin of bilateral import flows of 19% and 14% for China and India, respectively.
These predictions change when one allows for non-homothetic consumer behavior. In the
non-homothetic model, China and India extend their extensive margin of consumption as their
incomes increase (83% in China and 34% in India), so that the measures of imported varieties
actually increase by 47% and 29%. This translates into a median increase in the extensive
margins of bilateral import flows of 49% for China and 15% for India.
3.4.2 Changes in trade costs
In the second experiment, we consider the effect of reduction in trade costs. Lower trade costs
affect the extensive margin of trade through two channels. The first channel is the standard
supply side channel - lower trade costs imply that trade becomes worthwhile for more varieties,
i.e. the extensive margin of trade will expand. The second channel operates through the
demand side - lower trade costs lead to lower prices,21 which increases real incomes. With
higher incomes, agents will find consuming a broader set of varieties optimal, which in turn will
tend to increase the extensive margins of trade. In order to assess the relative importance of
these two channels, we take again the calibrated 2003 world economy and uniformly decrease
trade costs by 10, 25, and 50 percent.
From Table 5 reporting summary statistics on the percentage changes in the extensive
margins of bilateral trade, the starkly differing predictions of the homothetic and the non-
homothetic model become apparent.
Table 5
The homothetic model, for example, predicts that more than half of country-pairs actually
experience a reduction in the bilateral extensive margins in case of a 25%-reduction in trade
costs. This is because low-tech supplier countries were competitive in nearby markets in the
initial situation with high trade costs, but lower trade costs imply that they are now dominated
by countries with better technologies such that their export margins tend to fall. In the non-
homothetic model, this supply-side effect is attenuated by the demand-side effect of a rising
extensive margin of consumption, the absolute and relative changes in which are plotted in
Figure 5 against per capita income.
Figure 5
While poor countries experience the highest relative changes, middle income countries have
the highest absolute changes. Relative to the supply side effect, these changes are so large, for
example, that the number of country pairs experiencing decreasing extensive margins falls to
15% and the predicted median change is an increase of 22% instead of a decrease of 1% in the
homothetic model. These contrasting predictions demonstrate that accounting for demand side
21In the above experiments, we choose the US wage as the numéraire. Therefore, we describe the adjustment
via lower prices. Alternatively, with some goods price as the numéraire, the corresponding adjustment would
be described by lower trade costs increasing productivity and hence wages.
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effects is indeed quantitatively important when thinking about the extensive margin of bilateral
trade.
4 How general is the proposed channel?
We have presented a model of international trade where agents adjust their extensive margin of
consumption with income, which has quantitatively important effects for the extensive margin
of bilateral trade. In order to highlight this novel demand side channel, we kept the supply side
very simple by adapting a perfectly competitive Ricardian framework. We found that, when
allowing for non-homothetic consumer behavior, the EK model is not only able to capture the
pattern of aggregate trade volumes, but also the behavior of the extensive margin of trade. The
more general message is that the extensive margin of trade may be strongly driven through
differences in demand pattern across countries. In the following, we discuss how this channel
generalizes to richer models and why accounting for the demand side is potentially important.
A richer framework of international trade would model the firm explicitly by allowing for
market power as in Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003). Fixed market entry costs imply that not
all firms find it optimal to enter all markets, which gives rise to the extensive margin of trade.
In particular, for a given level of entry costs, entering bigger markets is more attractive, since
the contribution margin in these markets is larger. With homothetic preferences, the notion
of a big market is purely driven by aggregate GDP - it does not matter if we have a large
and poor population or a small and rich population due to constant expenditure shares. With
non-homothetic preferences, however, the decomposition of aggregate GDP becomes relevant
as poor agents adjust their expenditure shares with income. This is particularly apparent in the
model developed above when the expenditure share goes from zero (when the non-negativity
constraint is binding) to some positive share - the emerging extensive margin of consumption
then drives the extensive margin of trade. In a more general setting with market entry costs,
not only the bounded marginal utility is relevant, but also the fact that poor agents concentrate
their expenditures on relatively cheap goods. Thus, a small but rich market may be sufficiently
big, whereas demand in a poor but populous market (with the same aggregate GDP) may
be too low for the operating profits to cover market entry costs - accordingly, the small but
rich market's extensive margin of bilateral trade will tend to be higher than that in the large
but poor market. Clearly, not only average income, but also the entire shape of the income
distribution is relevant for a firm's entry decision in such a framework. Ignoring non-homothetic
demand thus leads a researcher to attribute differences in the extensive margins of import flows
entirely to differences in market entry costs, while a considerable part of the differences may be
driven by asymmetries in average income and income distribution (which is in fact supported
by the above findings).
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5 Robustness and extensions
5.1 Extending the model to trade in intermediates
The model we developed above is one of consumption goods only. We chose to abstract from
intermediate goods to keep the model as simple as possible. In this section, we outline a model
with intermediate goods and final goods - both tradable. The purpose of this extension is
twofold: First, we use the extended model to assess if abstracting from intermediate goods
introduces a significant bias in the quantification. Second, we used trade and GDP data to
compute the left hand side of equation (3.2). However, many papers using the EK framework
are models of trade in intermediates, in the context of which gross manufacturing output is used
instead of GDP data. With the intermediate extension, we need to use gross manufacturing
output, which allows us to assess the extent to which the results were driven by these different
ways of computing the normalized trade flows.
There are two industries in the extended model, ι = I, F . I produces tradable intermediate
goods and F produces tradable final goods.22 Both industries bundle labor and a CES-aggregate
of intermediates using a Cobb-Douglas production technology with labor share β. Cost mini-
mization implies that the price at which country i can offer a industry ι-variety jι in market n
is
pni (jι) =
dni
zi (jι)
wβi P
1−β
i ,
where Pi =
(´ 1
0
pi (jI)
1−σ djI
)1/(1−σ)
is the CES price index (pi(jI) is the price of variety jI in
country i).23 Assuming Fréchet distributed productivities with the same parameters across the
industries yields a gravity-like expression that looks in its reduced form similar to that derived
above
Xni
Xnn
= (dni)
−θ Si
Sn
.
However, there are two crucial differences. First, the total expenditures, Xn, are now the total
intermediate absorption, XIn, plus the total expenditures on final goods, X
F
n . Consequently, the
home supply must now be imputed by subtracting country's total manufacturing exports from
its gross manufacturing output, which we mostly get from UNIDO (2003) (details in Appendix
A.6). Data constraints reduce the sample to 71 countries. Second, the country fixed effects now
include the countries' intermediate price indices: Si = Ti
(
wβi P
1−β
i
)−θ
. Note that in the simple
model without intermediates the price indices Pi were absorbed into the calibrated technologies
and wages entered with an exponent of one. This implies that the model tended to overstate
the dispersion in technologies (the standard deviation in log of the calibrated technologies is 2.7
with intermediates vs. 7.5 without intermediates). Explicitly considering intermediates may
particularly matter for counterfactual experiments changing the trade costs, as this implies
22Note that it is usually assumed that final goods are non-traded in EK and follow up papers.
23We assume that the trade costs and labor share are the same across the two industries.
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potentially large changes in the intermediate price indices.
Using the same procedure as in the main text (but a different measure for Xn), we can
estimate the trade costs and the country fixed effects. There are again two approaches to re-
cover technologies. The more direct approach uses the estimated country fixed effects, Ŝi and
trade costs, dˆni, to compute the implied price indices, Pˆn =
(∑N
i=1 Ti
(
wβi P
1−β
i dni
)−θ)−1/θ
=(∑N
i=1 Sˆi
(
d̂ni
)−θ)−1/θ
, and then uses these price indices together with the per capita in-
comes, wi, and the calibrated values for β and θ to solve for the implied technologies, T̂i =
Ŝi
(
wβi P̂
1−β
i
)θ
.24 Alternatively, one can combine the estimated trade costs and the per capita
incomes and solve directly for the unique set of technologies for which all markets clear.25
The correlation (in logs) between the technologies thus calibrated is very high at 0.96. In the
counterfactual experiments, we use the technologies based on imposing market clearing.
The price distribution of final goods in country n is
Gn (p) = 1− exp
{
−pθ
N∑
i=1
Ti
(
wβi P
1−β
i dni
)−θ}
.
Normalizing technologies such that
∑N
i=1 Ti
(
wβi P
1−β
i dUSi
)−θ
= 1, we can use the same value
for the non-homotheticity parameter as above. Simulating the model thus calibrated yields the
importer income elasticity of the extensive margin of bilateral trade of 0.58 (the corresponding
elasticity in the model without intermediates is 0.57; the empirical elasticity is 0.50 in the
restricted sample of 71 countries). Considering the counterfactual experiments, the model
with intermediates generally features even stronger differences between the predictions of the
homothetic and the non-homothetic model. This is because the intermediate price index reacts
to changes in trade costs and technologies amplifying the reaction of the price distribution
of final goods, and agents thus tend to adjust their extensive margins of consumption more
strongly.
5.2 Inequality
Up to now, we abstracted from within-country inequality and had each country populated by
representative agents. Although most of the global inequality is indeed explained by differences
in average incomes, within-country inequality is a potentially important determinant for the
extensive margin of trade. Consider, for instance, two countries with the same average income,
but one with a wider range of the income distribution. The model predicts that the country
24In the calibration, β is set to 1/3. This value is derived by calculating the average labor share in UNIDO
(2003).
25Specifically, we take an initial guess for the technology vector, compute the implied price indices, and use
these together with the initial guess to compute pini and then the countries' balances of payments. We adjust
the technology guess using a tâtonnement-like algorithm until all markets clear.
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with richer agents has a broader extensive margin of consumption and thus tends to import
more varieties.26
Taking the present model literally implies that if each country features one very rich agent,
then all countries' extensive margins of consumption were one and all the demand side effects
disappeared. That is, the model's extensive margin is very sensitive to the upper tail of the
income distribution. The main explanation of why this may not be the case is based on the
presence of fixed market entry costs (beachhead costs). However, incorporating these costs into
the present framework would require departure from the competitive setting to allow for positive
markups that can be used to cover the beachhead costs. This in turn would disproportionally
complicate the model.27
Nonetheless, in order to get a feeling for the potential importance of the within-country
income distribution, we propose a simple exercise that allows us to stay within the Ricardian
framework. In particular, we choose to use the average income in the top quintile to compute
the extensive margin of consumption. Remember that conditional on entering market n, the
price distribution is the same across supplier countries. This in turn implies that the share of
consumer income spent on products from country i does not depend on income and equals to
pini.
28 Consequently, the aggregate value of the flow from i to n is still Xni = piniwnLn, i.e.
aggregate volumes do not depend on the income distribution. As a result, we can use the same
calibration strategy as above.
The non-homotheticity parameter x calibrated using the CEX data remains unchanged.
However, we acknowledge the presence of within-country inequality by using the average income
among the top quintile in the budget constraint (3.1) instead of per capita income. Taking the
model literally, this amounts to allowing for a general income distribution, which is bounded
by the average income in the top quintile. In a more general sense, we learn from this exercise
how the results change when trying to account for differences at the top of countries' income
distributions.
26Indeed, when repeating the regressions cited in the introduction including the importer's top quintile of
the income distribution, we get positive coefficients for the top quintile. The elasticity considering consumption
goods only is 0.23 and significant at the 1% level, whereas the elasticity for all types of goods is lower at 0.15
and significant only at the 10% level.
27Markups become endogenous with non-homothetic preferences . With a representative agent, the model still
preserves some tractability (see Simonovska (2010)), as there is one cutoff productivity per market above which
firms enter this market and below which firms abstain from entering. However, if one introduces within-country
inequality, firms not only decide whether to enter a market or not, but also whom to supply in this market.
The equilibrium in this case is characterized by a correspondence between a firm productivity and the income
of the agent, who consumes this firm's variety at the optimal quantity of zero. Unfortunately, there is no simple
expression for this correspondence in general (see Tarasov (2012b) for a special case with two countries and two
income classes).
28Consider consumer h with income whn in country n. Define her extensive margin of consumption by M
h
n .
Then, it is straightforward to show that the number of products produced in country i the consumer buys
is piniM
h
n (the argument is exactly the same as in the case with a representative agent). As, conditional on
entering market n, the price distribution is the same across supplier countries, the expenditures per product of
consumer h are whn/M
h
n . As a result, the expenditures on products produced by country i are piniM
h
n multiplied
by whn/M
h
n . This implies that, irrespective of income, consumers spend equal shares on products produced by
different countries.
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We use quintile data from UNU-WIDER (2008) that are described in detail in the Appendix
A.1. As the quintiles are not available for the full sample, we consider a smaller sample of 112
countries. We then reestimate the model parameters for this smaller sample of countries.29 We
find that accounting for within-country inequality by using average incomes in the top quintiles
in the budget constraint yields a lower importer income elasticity of 0.52 (vs. 0.46 in the data).
5.3 Alternative utility functions
In the theory part, we worked with a general utility function with the crucial feature of a
bounded marginal utility. We then had to assume some particular functional form for the
utility function (Stone-Geary) to quantify the model. This section considers two alternative
utility functions with bounded marginal utility and shows that the calibration results are robust
to changes in the functional form of the utility function. As our calibration strategy for the
demand side targets only one moment, we focus on one-parameter utility functions.
In particular, we consider a quadratic utility
vquadr (x) = x− 1
2
aquadrx2,
which is popular for its linear demand function and a constant absolute risk aversion utility
(CARA)
vcara (x) = − exp {−acarax} .
A reader might note that often these utility functions are written with three parameters.30
However, an aggregate utility function has a purely ordinal purpose in the context of a static
trade model, so that all monotonic transformations of the utility function, U =
´
v (x (j)) dj,
yield the same economic behavior.31 The one-parameter versions above are simply linear trans-
formations of the three parameter versions often seen.
As aggregate trade volumes do not depend on the particular functional form of the utility
function, the supply side parameters calibrated above (trade elasticity, trade costs, technologies)
still apply. Thus, we only need to recalibrate the demand side parameter. In Appendix A.5,
we present the analogues to equation (3.1) governing the extensive margin of consumption
for a given income and price distribution. Using these equations, we calibrate the new utility
parameters by targeting US consumers' income elasticity of the extensive margin consumption.32
We then simulate the calibrated models and calculate the income elasticities of the extensive
margin. The resulting exporter income elasticities are the same as above, as they do not depend
on the demand side of the model. The importer income elasticities, on the other hand, crucially
29For this smaller sample of countries, the calibrated importer income elasticity in the representative agent
model barely changes (0.62 instead of 0.63).
30vcara (x) = Bcara − Ccara exp {−acarax} and vquadr (x) = Bquadr + Cquadrx− 1/2aquadrx2.
31It is important to note that the transformation is applied to the aggregate utility function, U , and not
directly to the sub-utility function.
32The resulting parameters are aquadr = 0.28 and acara = 0.33.
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depend on the demand side as demonstrated above when comparing the homothetic model with
the non-homothetic model. However, when considering the alternative non-homothetic utility
functions, the importer income elasticities change only very little (0.618 for CARA and 0.623
for quadratic preferences instead of 0.63 for Stone-Geary). Similarly, the quantitative effects
in the counterfactual experiments do not change significantly. These results demonstrate that
the quantitative behavior of the model does not seem to depend very much on the particular
functional form of the sub-utility function.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we discuss an importing country's demand structure as a determinant of the
extensive margin of bilateral trade. We draw on the evidence of microeconomic studies that
show that richer agents consume more varieties. Allowing for such an extensive margin of
consumption in an otherwise standard Ricardian trade model offers an explanation for the
positive correlation between the extensive margin of bilateral trade and importer's per capita
income. We then quantify the model using data on aggregate trade volumes and US consumer
behavior. We find that the extensive margin of trade generated by the model behaves similarly
to what we observe in the data. Two counterfactual experiments demonstrate that this novel
demand side channel is quantitatively important.
We mention in the introduction that other authors have used non-homothetic preferences to
discuss different aspects of the pattern of international trade such as aggregate trade volumes
and quality. A potentially fruitful avenue for future research is a model where these two aspects
and the extensive margin of trade could be analyzed simultaneously. On the demand side, such
a framework would feature agents who adjust their consumption decision at the intensive, the
extensive, and the quality margin. On the supply side, variations in countries' abilities to
produce quality goods would introduce comparative advantages. Trade pattern  volumes,
extensive margin, and quality  could then be analyzed as the result of interactions of the
exporter country's production structure and the importer country's demand pattern.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the Country Specific Price Distribution Gn (p)
Using the productivity distribution and the pricing equation (2.4), the probability of country i
supplying a particular variety j at a price lower than p in market n can be written as
Gni (p) = Pr [Pni ≤ p] = Pr
[
widni
Zi (j)
≤ p
]
= Pr
[
widni
p
≤ Zi (j)
]
= 1− exp
{
−Ti (widni)−θ pθ
}
.
The probability that the lowest price on offer in market n is below p is the complement to
the probability that all offered prices lie above p
Gn (p) = Pr
[
min {Pni (j)}Ni=1 ≤ p
]
= 1− Pr
[
min {Pni (j)}Ni=1 > p
]
.
As the productivity draws are iid across countries, this probability is simply the product of the
individual probabilities, which yields the price distribution from the main text:
Gn (p) = 1−
N∏
i=1
Pr [Pni (j) > p] = 1− exp
{
−pθ
N∑
i=1
Ti (widni)
−θ
}
.
A.2 Derivation of the Trade Share pini
The probability that country i is the cheapest supplier for variety j in market n is given by
pini (j) = Pr
[
Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
=
ˆ ∞
0
Pr
[
p < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
dGni (p) .
Again, one can write the distribution of the minimum price as the product of the individual
distributions
ˆ ∞
0
Pr
[
p < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
dGni (p) =
ˆ ∞
0
∏
k 6=i
Pr [p < Pnk (j)] dGni (p)
=
ˆ ∞
0
∏
k 6=i
[1−Gnk (p)] dGni (p) .
Inserting for the price distributions yields
pini (j) =
ˆ ∞
0
∏
k 6=i
[1−Gnk (p)] dGni (p) = Ti (widni)
−θ∑N
k=1 Tk (wkdnk)
−θ .
Note that this probability does not depend on the index j, so that it also represents the
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share of varieties for which country i is the cheapest supplier in n
pini (j) = pini =
Ti (widni)
−θ
Φn
.
Specifically, the share of varieties for which country i is the cheapest supplier in n is given by´ 1
0
I
(
Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
)
dj, where I(.) is the indicator function. Using the law of large
numbers,
ˆ 1
0
I
(
Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
)
dj = E
{
I
(
Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
)}
= Pr
{
Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
}
= pini.
A.3 Conditional on Entry, Price Distributions are the Same Across
Sources
The distribution of prices from country i in market n conditional on being the cheapest supplier
is
Pr
[
Pni (j) ≤ p|Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
=
Pr
[
Pni (j) ≤ p, Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
Pr
[
Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
] .
The denominator is pini. The nominator can be written as
Pr
[
Pni (j) ≤ p, Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
=
ˆ p
0
Pr
[
x < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
dGni (x) .
Recall that
Pr
[
x < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
=
∏
k 6=i
[1−Gnk (p)] .
Thus,
Pr
[
Pni (j) ≤ p, Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
=
ˆ p
0
∏
k 6=i
[1−Gnk (x)] dGni (x) = piniGn (p) .
Reinserting this into the initial expression completes the proof:
Pr
[
Pni (j) ≤ p|Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i
]
= Gn (p) = Pr
[
min {Pnk (j)}Nk=1 ≤ p
]
.
Note that the number of varieties exported by country i to country n is given by
ˆ 1
0
I
(
Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i , Pni (j) < v′(0)/λn
)
dj.
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Using the law of large numbers, the latter can be rewritten as follows:
Pr
[
Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i , Pni (j) < v′(0)/λn
]
.
Using the previous analysis, one can derive that
Pr
[
Pni (j) < min {Pnk (j)}k 6=i , Pni (j) < v′(0)/λn
]
= piniGn (v
′(0)/λn) = piniMn.
A.4 Derivation of the Budget Constraint for Stone-Geary Preferences
First note that with the Stone-Geary utility, the first order conditions (2.1) become
1
x (j) + x¯
= λp (j) for x (j) > 0
1
x¯
< λp (j) for x (j) = 0.
Using these first order conditions, we can solve for the price of the marginal variety
p (M) =
v′ (0)
λ
=
1
x¯λ
and for the inverse of the marginal utility of income respectively
1
λ
= x¯p (M) .
Optimal expenditures for varieties j < M are
p (j)x (j) =
1
λ
− x¯p (j) = x¯ (p (M)− p (j)) .
Inserting this into a country n agent's budget restriction (2.3) yields
wn = x¯
(
p (Mn)Mn −
ˆ p(Mn)
0
pdGn (p)
)
.
Using the country specific price distribution Gn (p), one can write
p (Mn) = G
−1
n (Mn) =
(
− log (1−Mn)
Φn
) 1
θ
and
dGn (p) = θp
θ−1Φn exp
{−pθΦn} dp.
29
Substituting this into the budget constraint yields
wn = x¯
((
− log (1−Mn)
Φn
) 1
θ
Mn −
ˆ p(Mn)
0
pθpθ−1Φn exp
{−pθΦn} dp) .
Changing variables in the integral, t = pθΦn, we derive that
wn = x¯
((
− log (1−Mn)
Φn
) 1
θ
Mn −
ˆ p(Mn)θΦn
0
(
t
Φn
) 1
θ
exp {−t} dt
)
,
where the integral equals the incomplete Gamma function so that we can write
wn = x¯
((
− log (1−Mn)
Φn
) 1
θ
Mn −
(
1
Φn
) 1
θ
γ
(
1
θ
+ 1, p (Mn)
θ Φn
))
.
Substituting for the price of the marginal variety and rearranging finally lead to the expression
of the main text.
A.5 The Budget Constraints for Alternative Utility Functions
The steps to derive the budget constraints are very similar to those outlined in Appendix
A.4. Therefore, we omit their derivations. For a given income, E, and price distribution,
G (p) = 1− exp{−Φpθ}, the budget constraint with quadratic utility is
E =
(Φ)−
1
θ
aquadr
γ
(
1
θ
+ 1;− log (1−M)
)
− (Φ)
− 1
θ
aquadr
(− log (1−M))− 1θ γ
(
2
θ
+ 1;− log (1−M)
)
.
With CARA preferences, the budget constraint spells
E = − θΦ
acara
ˆ (− log(1−M)/Φ) 1θ
0
log
((
− log (1−M)
Φ
)− 1
θ
p
)
pθ exp
(−Φpθ) dp.
A.6 Data
We use data for the year 2003. In the baseline specification, the sample consists of 164 countries,
which corresponds to 26732 = 164 ∗ 163 bilateral trade relations. In the following, we describe
the sources of the data used in the quantification.
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A.6.1 Aggregate value of bilateral trade
We use the COMTRADE trade data of the year 2003 as provided by CEPII (Gaulier, Zignago,
Sondjo, Sissoko, and Paillacar, 2010). This data set provides the dollar values of the bilateral
trade flows between 239 economic entities (mostly countries) on the HS6 level of aggregation
Xni (j), which corresponds to 5111 goods categories. Summing over all HS6 categories, we get
the aggregate value of a bilateral trade flow from exporting country i to importing country n,
Xni =
∑5111
j=1 Xni (j) .
A.6.2 Extensive margin of bilateral trade
We use a simple and intuitive measure for the extensive margin of bilateral trade, which counts
the number of HS6 categories with positive volumes
mni =
∑
j
I (Xni (j) > 0) ,
where I (Xni (j) > 0) is an indicator function taking the value of one if the bilateral trade flow
from i to n in the HS6-category j is positive. A potential drawback of this measure is the fact
that the HS6 categories are defined for customs purposes. As a result, heavily regulated goods
tend to have more categories. The associated measurement error is absorbed into the error
term and the estimated elasticities are unbiased, if the coarseness of the traded HS6-categories
is orthogonal to the regressors.
An alternative measure for the extensive margin is brought forward by Broda and Weinstein
(2006)
mBWni =
∑
j Xn (j) I (Xni (j) > 0)∑
j Xn (j)
,
where Xn (j) =
∑
k 6=nXnk (j) is the value of country n's total imports in category j. One of
the main advantages of this measure is that the categories are weighted, which may alleviate
measurement errors due to differences in the coarseness of the categorization. However, in the
present context, this measure of the extensive margin may be inappropriate for two reasons.
First, this measure is derived using a CES demand system (Feenstra, 1994), whereas the central
assumption in our model is that preferences are non-CES. Second and more important, in the
context of the present model, the numerator represents the trade flows from i to n, Xni, while
the denominator is the n's total imports in all categories,
∑
k 6=nXnk. Using the corresponding
expressions from the model, one can see that mBWni = pini/ (1− pinn). That is, the central
element of the theory - the extensive margin of consumption - cancels, implying that the Broda
and Weinstein (2006) measure is unlikely to reflect the income effects coming from the non-
homothetic consumer behavior.
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A.6.3 Per capita incomes and population sizes
The per capita incomes and the population sizes are taken from the World Bank's World
Development Indicator. The per capita incomes are measured in current (year 2003) US-
dollars. Following EK, we deliberately abstain from using purchasing power adjusted incomes
as deviations from PPP arise endogenously in the EK framework.
A.6.4 Bilateral distances, shared border, and common language
All transportation cost proxies are from the database provided by CEPII. The bilateral distance
is measured as the distance between two countries' most populous cities. The common language
indicator takes the value one if two countries have the same official language33 and the common
border dummy takes the value one if two countries share a common land border.
A.6.5 CEX
The US consumer expenditure survey (CEX) is a rotating panel collected by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS). Its interview survey part provides detailed information on household
characteristics and expenditures. One of the main purposes of the survey is its use in deter-
mining and revising the baskets that are used for the computation of the consumer price index.
We obtain the CEX data from the website of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and
Social Research (ICPSR). A detailed documentation of the data can be found in BLS (2003).
In the following, we briefly discuss the raw data and how we processed the raw data.
The unit of observation in the CEX is a consumer unit, CU, which basically comprises
all members of a household using their income to make joint expenditures.34 Each CU is in
the panel for 5 consecutive quarters with one interview per quarter. The initial interview only
collects demographic characteristics, while the following four interviews collect expenditures
from the previous three months. Expenditures are collected for around 600 categories (repre-
sented by universal classification codes, UCC). Of these 600 UCCs, we select the UCCs that
correspond to tradable manufactures. This clearly involves some ad hoc decisions. Specifically,
we develop two classifications - a conservative classification, where we disregard all uncertain
UCCs, and a liberal classification, which includes more UCCs.
Housing related items are particularly difficult, since they are often separated by renter,
owned home, and owned vacation home. We disregard these UCCs altogether in the conserva-
tive classification. In the liberal classification, we lump the renter and owner categories for the
same expense together. For instance, we combine the categories Installed and non-installed
replacement wall to wall carpeting for owned homes and Installed and non-installed original
wall to wall carpeting for rental homes into one category, and ignore UCCs that are only
33The results remain basically unchanged when using major languages instead of official languages.
34Under this definition, a family constitutes a CU, while a boarder living with the family would constitute
his own CU as he is financially independent.
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available for either renter or owner such as Installed and non-installed original wall to wall
carpeting for owned homes.
Another difficult class of UCCs is related to clothing - a CU buying men's footwear de-
pends very much whether this CU comprises an adult male. We therefore lump UCCs together
across gender and age in the liberal classification, e.g. we collapse men's footwear, women's
footwear, Boys' footwear, and Girls' footwear into one category. The conservative classifi-
cation disregards these categories. In the end, the liberal classification consists of 186 distinct
expenditure categories, and the conservative classification comprises 107 categories.
A.6.6 Manufacturing absorption
We use data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2003) on
gross manufacturing output. For the year 2003, this database provides the gross manufacturing
output for 74 countries. Unfortunately, the database does not include gross output for several
large countries, most notably China. We therefore choose to impute the gross manufacturing
output for countries that belonged to the 20 largest economies in 2003 and for which we have
no gross manufacturing output. We do this by following Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004)
and scaling value added in the manufacturing sector by the average ratio of gross output and
value added across countries. These countries are China, Switzerland, Canada, and Mexico.
Finally, for seven countries, the difference between the gross manufacturing output and the
total exports, Xnn, appears to be negative, so that we exclude these countries from the sample.
As a result, the sample consists of 71 countries.
A.6.7 Top quintiles of income distributions
We get data on the top quintiles of the income distributions from UNU-WIDER (2008). A well-
known problem of inequality data is that the measure, which the inequality data refers to, varies
across countries. In particular, some quintiles refer to expenditures and the others to income.
Moreover, income may be measured in gross or net terms. To correct for this, we follow Dollar
and Kraay (2002) and regress the observed quintiles on dummies for the underlying measure.
We then use the resulting coefficients to estimate the net income quintiles.
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Table 1: Dependent variable - extensive margin of bilateral trade
variable coefficient
per capita income exporter 0.66∗∗∗
importer 0.47∗∗∗
population size exporter 0.65∗∗∗
importer 0.30∗∗∗
bilateral distance [375, 750) −0.78∗∗∗
[750, 1500) −1.49∗∗∗
[1500, 3000) −2.26∗∗∗
[3000, 6000) −2.50∗∗∗
[6000,∞) −2.88∗∗∗
additional controls shared border 0.45∗∗∗
same language 0.74∗∗∗
N = 16053, R2 = 0.63, ∗∗∗ implies significance at the 1%-level
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Table 2: Dependent variable - extensive margin of consumption
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Table 3: Estimated trade costs
estimated coefficients
variable coefficient %-effect
[375, 750) −0.53∗∗∗ 13%
[750, 1500) −1.52∗∗∗ 40%
[1500, 3000) −1.97∗∗∗ 55%
[3000, 6000) −2.84∗∗∗ 88%
[6000,∞) −3.33∗∗∗ 110%
shared border 0.77∗∗∗ -16%
same language 0.82∗∗∗ -17%
estimated trade costs (dni)
countries mean∗∗∗ median
OECD 2.01∗∗∗ 1.89
non-OECD 4.27∗∗∗ 3.53
all countries 3.91∗∗∗ 3.14
Table 4: : Income elasticities of the extensive margin of bilateral trade
elasticities in models
data non-homothetic homothetic
exporter income 0.66 0.86 0.86
importer income 0.47 0.63 −0.12
Table 5: : Summary statistics for changes in trade costs
10%-reduction 25%-reduction 50%-reduction
new EK new EK new EK
mean 9% 2% 27% 5% 103% 37%
median 8% 0% 22% −1% 85% 18%
top10% 22% 16% 65% 43% 207% 118%
bottom10% −2% −11% −3% −25% 16% −31%
% negative 15% 49% 15% 51% 6% 35%
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Figure 1: Demand function
Figure 2: Extensive margin of consumption
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Figure 3: Calibrated technologies vs. observed incomes
Figure 4: Calibrated extensive margins of consumption vs. observed incomes
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Figure 5: Absolute and relative changes in the extensive margin of consumption
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